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Abstract 
The evolution of the market development of any kind registered an overlapping and 
conditioning of financial markets and economic performances, reinforcing, after the 80’s, the 
connections between the financial system and industrial economy in relation to the age of 
conglomerates. Although the financial system uses its assumed functions of not being responsible 
for the cyclic instability of the economies, which has a negative influence over the average rate of 
economic growth over long periods, macroeconomic analyses reflect the financial origins of cyclic 
instability.  
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Introduction 
The functioning of the markets is mainly based on two models, the “Neoclassical general 
equilibrium model” and the “Basic Walrasian model”. 
 
The neoclassical general equilibrium model comprises the general equilibrium properties 
of commodities markets and capital goods and of financial markets. Within these we find the same 
form: the atomicity of supply and demand, homogeneity of products, transparency of exchanges, 
and mobility of financial resources. In a perfect competition, the free allocation of capital allows 
continuously raising their economic performances at an optimal level. 
The basic Walrasian model has multiple characteristics: economic and financial decisions 
are made by rational individuals who are perfectly informed regarding market conditions at any 
given moment; the markets have monopoly over the aggregation and alignment of supply and 
demand; the so-called pure and perfect “competition” excludes all forms of power over prices; the 
equilibrium prices are a result of anonymous forces. 
The model brings a response to one of the problems that continue to be asked for over a 
century. It incites to an approach based on the specificity of the nature of the relations between the 
financial market and economic performances, taken as a whole. 
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Literature Review 
• I. Relations still limited by mediators 
The neoclassical financial market organises the meeting between the agents holding 
financial capacities and the agents needing financing. Manufacturers, sellers of commodities, are 
not in the position to self-finance 100% of their equipment expenses. They can manage the 
placement of their available capitals in addition to supply. In this model, the supply of capital 
meets the corresponding demand without financial mediators. The equilibrium of all the 
economies supplied by the capital and investments market, with no losses, is reached with nil 
mediation costs. The market may differentiate what equilibriums are possible.  
Keynes’ general theory marked a rupture with the unifying visions summarised by the 
markets’ general equilibrium. Therefore, two sides of the market are very different. Businesses and 
individuals are not in the symmetrical relation adopted by Walras for the representation of the 
supply and demand addressed to markets of commodities and factors. 
The capital market works in accordance with all modalities that make this difference as 
imaginable neoclassical models. Wicksell highlighted, against the orthodoxy of his age, the role of 
banks within the credit market: distinguishing between the natural rate of interest and the monetary 
rate required by the banks, which prefigures the Keynesian developments of the marginal 
effectiveness of capital and the use, which is of interest to this day, of the rate of return on equities.  
The capital’s rate of interest includes the variable risks premiums in accordance with the 
debtors’ quality. The aversion to risk incites to prudence and abstention; under the form of 
distrusting the volume of exchanges, and the judgment used in obtaining credits and the miracle of 
capital operations make the economy to be one of under-investment, if the neoclassical model is 
taken as a reference standard. 
The imperfections of the market information open with the Malthusian practices, which keep 
in check the increases and degradations that are of no use.
1 
The global role of banks and, at a broader level, of the financial mediations ensemble, is 
a positive one in regards to adjusting the capital supply and demand.
2 Regarding the term of 
“financial system”, it also includes the capital market. 
A system in which specialised organisations, banks and other mediators facilitate the 
movement and distribution of capitals links these two activities. Generally, the management of 
primary economies consists of entrusting their liquidities to an ensemble of financial institutions 
that act as institutional investors: pension funds, mutual funds and SICAV, speculative funds, 
insurers, private equity funds, real estate participants’ guarantors, etc. 
Banks remain the main source of external funds for enterprises. Or, banks act in a 
double risk universe. On one hand, as all enterprises, the bank is subject to the constraints of 
financial equilibrium; they are concerned with winning parts of the profitable markets; they 
compete and cooperate with the syndicates on competitive markets; they consider shareholders: 
they fully participate in mergers, acquisitions and other restructurings.
3 As such, they diversify 
their activities (credits, deposits, enterprises reconciliations, financial arrangements, wealth 
management, etc.), and differentiate their products and services for a better capitalisation of their 
distinctive advantages. The monetary market introduces new financial instruments; alternative 
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financing procedures allow large enterprises to depend less on credit institutions for their cash 
needs. For the large clients’ services segment, banks exploit their compared advantages. The 
specific advantage of a bank in relation to other financial mediators is providing two services 
instead of one: underwriting and procuring payments instruments which, in excellence, are the 
currency, and that which offers credits, guarantees and other derivatives. These activities generate 
together synergies that reduce the estimation costs of credit risk, since the history of a deposit 
account informs a banker about the financial position of the depositing client. The bank is also a 
coalition of creditors that diversifies the credit risks. Depending of their market share, enterprises 
accept debt after the banks have an inferior rate of interest to the market price because the bank 
sees the confidential information it holds, signalling their high quality market; this confidential 
signal allows the entity to supplement its financing sources by addressing the market. On the other 
hand, banks encourage specific types of risks, such as the credit risk and the liquidity risk. 
The relation of the bank with its client evolves constantly depending on the business climate 
and its solvability. 
The activities with banks should be accompanied by a high service quality bringing returns for the 
banks, but not through suspicious loans: the deposits’ liquidity should be guaranteed; the increase of credit 
risks and operational risks should be competently overseen; clients should have the capacity to measure to 
an extent the loyalty for supporting the bank in case of difficulties. In case of bankruptcy, a banker strongly 
affects his clients. Maintaining a reduced competition on the credit market functions soundly only when 
the probability of debtors’ weakness remains within tolerable limits. 
 
Foreign currencies, loans and reimbursements on the capital market are a collective 
commodity: they are not accepted solely for the simple fact of being liberated, to answer to the 
wording Keynes used to summarize the neoclassical model.
4 The value of the currency dominates 
the relations between creditors and debtors. The Central Bank arbitrates in this manner between its 
role as a lender of last resort and its mission as “master of inflation”; this implies that, in the 
position of “master”, it would increase the monetary mass and oversee the quality of the credits 
granted in the economy.
5 
To summarize, banking and financial mediations have multiple particularities. There are 
various activities that allow, at a global level, the reduction of the uncertainty of deponents, of 
those who make primary economies and of investors of all kinds.  
The multiplication of financial products and of securitisation possibilities for a resale on the 
financial markets ultimately allows the adjustment of market supply and demand. Financial 
mediations aggregate the multiple small economies, and diversify and mutualise risks. At the same 
time, they have functions which, if used competently and honestly, favour economic efficiency, at 
a general level, stimulate growth and the use of workforce.  
Certain financial mediation activities generate operation costs. They are a consequence of the 
fact that primary economies are not wholly transformed into productive investments through 
lenders. They cannot generate a loss that would result in a lack of earnings for the national 
economy in relation to the neoclassical optimal level, since financial mediations are not attributed 
with a lack of earnings in real cases related to uncertainties, information asymmetries and 
countless moral hazard manifestations in business relations.  
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The financial market is congenitally opaque because of the simple fact that changeable assets 
are carriers of eminently random future return promises. Financial mediators, holders of primary 
economies bring a higher security and the trust they inspire in attracting capital without which 
there may be no contribution to production development. 
There are countries where the financial services activity (necessary and of national 
magnitude) occupies a significant part in relation to GDP generating activities. 
Financial mediators raise problems within the national economies because the neoclassical 
model does not have the necessary vocation to deal with them. This pure economy model sets 
aside space: it explores the economic logic of work within a world without borders. The insertion 
of national economies within the world dynamics highlights these problems. Our world, 
fragmented between over 200 nations of unequal powers, recirculates half a dozen key statements 
in order to facilitate the international transactions ensemble. Combinations between flexible 
foreign exchange rates and the free movement of information made the financial system strongly 
interconnected at a global level, being integrated starting form the end of the 19
th century. National 
economies conserve financing circuits that are not indirectly integrated within the global system. 
Within the EU, which is more familiar to a system adopted in the 19
th century, assumed finances 
decisively participate to the market economy. 
After the end of the 1970’s, institutional investors entered the capital markets and 
gathered the power of the arbitrages recently held by the financial directors of 
conglomerates.
6 Industrial enterprises were borrowed in order to achieve their mission of 
producing goods and services, of invoking procedures and products and of ensuring their 
positions as leaders on their markets. M. Pineau Valencienne counted in 1980 approximately 
450 segments of globalised markets (type bluejean, rover). They reached over 10,000 today, 
and will reach 20,000 in the near future. 
The capital market tends to assume its quotations in financial matters and proposes 
instruments adapted to the infinite varieties of partner needs: derivative products, asset swaps, 
financial volumes, etc. At the same time, the financial market has included industrial enterprises 
that wish to change their management criteria, without forgetting the theory regarding the election 
of activity portfolios from stock exchanges (that reveals an insurance diversification behaviour) in 
order to re-centre the activities in which the enterprises are more competitive (core businesses) in a 
manner that allows the capital market to run its activity, judge more investments and allow 
industrial enterprises to fathom their penetration on international markets. 
This separation of activities is present through international investors as a guarantee of a 
higher transparency over a real profitability of productive investments from the so-called real area.  
Finances are also attractive through the rate of return of equity funds (ROE: Return on 
Equity) which remunerates the enterprise’s risk and its shareholders. ROE perspectives direct 
equity funds towards productive investments developed and operated by the enterprises judged as 
being the most effective. 
Economic games are iterative, the investors carefully observing the results achieved by the 
enterprises. They develop the assumptions of a long series of successes, given with more talent 
rather than hazard; they assume that in relation to the market signals, enterprises have a certain 
chance to be encouraged in their projects to make other more efficient judgements.
7 
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This evolution, begun in the 1980’s, reinforced the links between the financial system and 
industrial economy in relation to the age of conglomerates. Macroeconomic analysis highlighted 
the financial origins of cyclic instability. It emphasizes the attraction relations between profits, 
investor anticipations, and equipment and credit expenses.
8 The increase of stock exchange rates 
creates a euphoric climate, facilitating loans. However, enterprises indebtedness increases risk. 
Investments multiply in a reasonable manner, also as a result of the credits offered by a good 
market, and banks share the investors’ optimism. Or, just as in Ricardo’s rationale regarding the 
most fertile lands cultivated, enterprises start choosing more investment projects. 
In the expansion contraction phase, the phenomena reverse the game. However, decreasing 
the percentage of used workforce and decelerating salary quotas limits the fall of benefits. And, 
once the concerns regarding the revival of inflation are calmed, banks may be delighted to play a 
part against cyclicality.  
Recent activities show a diversification of the mediums through which the “financial and 
monetary sector” influences the evolution and maintenance of the return to cyclicality.
9 The 
strictly monetary perspective acts as an advisor for the Central Bank for the width of the directing 
rate of interest, the volume of the mandatory reserves and the allotment of retirement effects. But, 
if an interest rate decrease encourages credit demand and increases the monetary mass, it will 
shrink on the longer term, to the extent in which the reimbursements volume exceeds that of new 
loans, which may delay a renewal of credits in the initial volume. 
Contemporary theory emphasises the respective roles of direct finances (public directly paid 
in shares and bonds issues) and intermediate funding: bank credits, infusions from other financial 
institutions, funds management.
10 Exigent remuneration includes a premium increased for reasons 
directly related to risk. The rate of indebtedness of capital requesters is an indicator signalling 
risk.
11 
Mediation allows financing more complex industrial operations, brings tolerance for 
information asymmetries that influence the long financial information control chain.
12 
  
II. Economic performances are partially disconnected from the financial market  
The facts resulted from the last unfolded period call for four sets of reflections regarding: the 
respective stimulation devices of business leaders, the financial market efficiency, the weaknesses 
of financial information control bodies, and business valuation. They lead to a prediction of a 
maximum of efforts directed to improving operations transparency, but the limits of these efforts 
are not emphasised.  
a) The relation between the agent uniting leaders and external shareholders is as relaxed as the 
participation of the first capitals in the enterprise, which is limited proportionately with the equity 
funds as their personal wealth. Or, the leaders hold privileged information that grants an advantage 
over the shareholders and administrators it represents. This situation is favourable to conflicts of 
interest with the shareholders, who are, at the same time, those who save up, concerned with 
receiving their dividends and, as much as the owners, ultimately bear the residual receivable risk. 
Through the stock exchange, shareholders offer a way out through the liquidity of their securities. 
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The idea stimulated leaders, who mostly take into account the shareholders interests, to use the share 
options method, which appears to have logical substance. Also, when options are correlated with the 
high advantageous prices of the last year, they contribute to certain increases of the number of shares 
and to a decrease of benefits to the disadvantage of external shareholders.   
At the same time, a partial consideration of the problems raised by the share options 
distribution, entry price, and conservation expenses results in the alignment of the leaders’ interest 
research over shareholders not being automatically correlated with the enterprises’ conduct over 
the long term. The continuous research of the enterprise’s maximum value for its shareholders may 
prejudice the adoption of projects more favourable towards competition over the medium and long 
terms.  
(b) Second, an economy that complies with the canons of the neoclassical model reaches 
efficiency. A more realistic and dynamic approach to economic performances and financial market 
transparency leads to distinguishing multiple efficiency decreases over the last period. In adopting 
the point of view of securities buyers and sellers, the financial market is efficient if it allows 
balancing their portfolios, even the more as this is in their own interest.
13 
E. Fama (1961, 1970, 1991) analysed three decreases of efficiency, in accordance with the 
available type of information. He distinguishes a weaker variety, in which the information 
historically reduces the stock exchange rate, a semi-strong where the information cover all of the 
published data susceptible to influence the enterprise’s value (balance sheet, accounts, PER, 
circumstances, etc,), and a strong form that includes privileged information only accessible to 
initiates.
14 
In accordance with the strong efficiency hypothesis, agents operate on the financial market 
while holding perfect information; this public information, in its entirety, comprises the price of 
the shares synthesised by current and present stages. Agents can also measure each security’s 
expected profitability and risk. No one can estimate the sustainability of a superior market 
performance. Optimist economies affect their time crossing resources and provide the enterprises 
with the funds they need to invest. Strong efficiency defines the market’s condition when all the 
possibilities to make mutually advantageous transactions are exhausted. At the limit, transactions 
stop and the market becomes inactive in the moment it becomes absolutely efficient. The volume 
of the transactions observed on this type of efficient financial market is limited to the quasi-
instantaneous observation of new opportunities for advantageous investments. 
This school case homogeneously deals with both capital and goods markets. Fama considers 
the financial market efficiency a necessary condition for the optimum in economy, the so-called 
“competition”. This market achieves an optimal allocation of capitals and equal securities 
transactions without delays of profit rates in different activity sectors. The rationale of the 
description of properties in a pure market economy makes transactions insure by themselves the 
coordination of economic activities. If such an economy exists, the price mechanism is sufficient 
to guide the entrepreneurs’ saving decisions.   
Or, an economy of this type ignores the enterprises, their particular solidity, their singularities 
and their market capacities. Enterprises with interdiction shall generate by their presence the 
compliance with the efficiency conditions of the financial market. Convergence between the 
market efficiency and the economic optimum disappears when perfect competitive conditions are 
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missing. This is the case of reasons concerning the capital demand, issued by large listed 
companies.   
The notion of available information is ambiguous. In our world, leaders inevitably hold 
private information and tacit knowledge which procure perspicacity to the market. They decide 
according to detailed technical, commercial information and financial reasons. The enterprise 
which sells its shares on the market, for example, in order to increase its capital, does not act as a 
simple securities seller.   
Strong efficiency does not recognize the continuity solution which separates enterprises with 
results marked by incertitude and by those who save a lot and can distribute their risks by 
diversifying their portfolios and proceed to instantaneous arbitrations.     
All companies exposed to competition are inclined to notice a minimum of discretion on 
these trumps, preferences or strategic choices not in order to surprise their competitors or to gain a 
contract or important orders. An enterprise remains somehow opaque in order to defend itself 
against competition. And it is contraindicated “to say everything, everything in time”.
15 They often 
make enterprises cross a major crisis in order to reveal these real difficulties.
16 A premature 
disclosure of these difficulties risks aggravating choices in closing ways to eventual remedies.  
These discordances limit the contribution by which financial markets ca bring their contribution 
directly to the economic growth of countries that cross the expansion of their enterprises.   
The financial market efficiency favors the instantaneous allocation of resources within a static 
analysis. This is a reason of the concentration on the elimination of improvidence by the liberty of 
procedures for profitable transactions.   
The extension of the general equilibrium model of the capital market paradoxically attributes 
value to listed enterprises when this model does not grant any consistency to the price difference 
of any goods on a perfectly competitive market, and the stock value does not explain the real price 
of the enterprise. It is obvious that a profound, liquid and transparent financial market is likely to 
favor capital allocations and more information concerning the value of every day resulted loans 
and projects of enterprises with an open market.
17 The share price acquires a distinct statute as 
concerns the strong efficiency form: it does not synthetically reflect all information concerning the 
enterprise value, but is an indicator which does not react alone to the variety of information 
concerning enterprises and, at the same time, to overall market data.
18 
The financial market corresponds to these descriptions efficiently placed in attenuated forms, 
by the conditions that justify the existence of game rules as concerns information and authorized 
by the exchange market which require their compliance. The half-strong efficiency is convenient 
for a profoundly heterogeneous economy or for industrial and financial groups that replace and 
complete the markets.   
Within this type of organized economy, the capital markets assume the advisor part with 
several and contradictory operator objectives; liquidity is procured from the exterior in order to 
resume Hirschman’s terminology (Voit, Voice and Loyalty) with yields which suppose a 
minimum loyalty among participants. This organized market is found among operators that do not 
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have the same aversion against risk, the same implicit discount rate, or the same preference 
between dividends and added value.      
In order that a financial market can provide reliable information, it is necessary for the market 
authorities to insure transparency, liquidity and profoundness. These conditions favor the 
economic growth and use of workforce. It leads to a larger distribution of high quality financial 
information, which can reduce the distrust of small holders in stock transactions with their origin 
functions – in other words, they associate more openly the financial market with the economic 
performances of enterprises.    
However, the improvement of financial information is never radical as wished for. 
Nevertheless, it is enough for the volume of the assets acquired or desired by financial investments 
to be forced to correlate to the quality of their information so that games are made before small 
holders could react in time. 
(c) In the third place, authorities tutor the intervention on control modalities as concerns 
financial information in order to remedy the market imperfections. In a world where the moral 
hazard is widespread, their vigilance is indispensable. It defines the game rules and the 
classification of the activity of several intermediaries which operate on the financial markets where 
they influence decisions. Their control is exercised, first of all, in a direct manner the regulation 
and publication of information, regulating authorities for the financial markets - AMF, SEC) and 
then in an indirect manner (deontology, self-discipline). 
Or, the financial market is animated by an influence of intermediaries. Their activity is 
apparently improved by the market transparency and reduction of information asymmetries. They 
provide services and products adjusted to the needs generated by the two market quotas:  that of 
expert accountants, audit institutions, strategy advisors, financial analysts investment banks, 
pension funds trustees, mutual funds, speculative funds, departments of patrimony management 
advisors within banks and insurance companies.  
d) In the fourth and last place, one cannot return to values and enterprise evaluation without 
underlining three characteristics given by the current crisis, which show the relative importance of 
novelties.    
• Several enterprises present the “new economy” and MTT (medium and telecommunication 
technologies) looking for external financing in order to profit as soon as possible of the “profit 
equations”
19; 
• Intangible assets (patents, logistics, trademarks, personnel skills, contracts, etc.) obtain a 
more and more particular importance during the technological revolution period;    
• Enterprise relationships cover a large variety of possibilities to overpass the width of the 
competition field, of an expected competition in the sense of frontal rivalry.
20 
 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, if it is indispensable to ensure transparency of financial markets, hope can be 
placed where they meet the limits they operate within. Transparency depends on the achievement 
of two conditions: the publication of the accounts in a sincere and objective manner; the insurance 
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that everything is legally available at any moment to the same information on results and 
perspectives of enterprise evolution. It prevents the deformed propagation of information and 
keeps a good watch on enterprises, so that they cannot hide data they should give to the market. 
Or, the accounting and financial information did not particularly revealed the trumps and 
handicaps of companies and market evolution factors. These dissatisfactions are based on two 
reasons. On one hand, the logic of an enterprise which acts in different periods from those of the 
financial market that animates actors at different and unstable horizons. An enterprise cannot raise 
again the question of data updating according to which it based its strategically important 
decisions; investors are freer to move in this area. On the other hand, the notion of transparency, if 
taken on paper, allows obtaining simple prices (COB). Transparency of financial analyses is 
opposite to the synthesis needs of the market actors. In this respect, the activity course ceases to 
provide a synthetic indication, sufficient in different interpretation and comment reasons, with 
events and acts mark the enterprise life.   
Therefore, transparence is not light. To the extent in which transparency is an efficiency 
condition of the financial market, the latest remains inaccessible, as a strong form.    
In other words, like Roland Barthes who affirmed about Racine’s heroes: “Transparency of 
an ambiguous value: it is given and nothing says and can say.” 
Generally speaking, the objectives of accounts and publicity of market operations provide 
indisputable advantages to establish a favorable climate of economic efficiency in the development 
of capital markets. It is more comprehensible that the enterprise is judged according to the quality 
of its products by its clients; at the same time, it can admit as legitimate the fact that investors 
appreciate regulate quality intervals of enterprise management to which they entrust their funds. In 
this respect, the measurement of regulations imposed by the United States (the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Law- July, 2002) and Europe (the Law on financial security in France) is generated by 
reinforcement reasons of information objectives and transparency of financial operations.   
However, for their justification they concern the immediate interests of investors, and do not 
end by a time discordance which belongs to the own nature of the capitalist system.    
The progress achieved in the stock telecommunication and computerization accelerates the 
market transactions, without disturbing laws that govern the strategic balance of firms, maintained 
and improved by their competitive skills.   
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